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1. INTRODUCTION 
In 1990 Britain led Europe in unbundling, liberalizing and privatizing the 
electricity supply industry3 and paved the way for the European Commission to enact a 
series (three and counting) of Directives to create liberalized and integrated energy 
markets across the European Union.4 The advantages of competition, when combined 
with appropriate restructuring and incentive regulation, have been demonstrated5 and 
underpin the European Union’s commitment to a market approach to energy policy. 
However, the growing acceptance of the challenge of climate change, the need to 
decarbonize electricity rapidly and, as part of that goal supporting the massive 
deployment of renewables through the EU’s Renewables Directive (2009/28/EC), has 
created major challenges to the traditional utility model. The most mature renewables, 
wind and solar PV, are intermittent and have low reliable capacity factors but high peak 
outputs. Subsidies to solar PV have disproportionately favoured sub-scale domestic 
household take-up, and in contrast to past conventional generation connected to 
transmission networks and dispatched by the System Operator, a significant fraction of 
renewables is connected to distribution networks (90% in the EU: EC, 2016) and not 
subject to dispatch. Distributed Energy Resources (DER), including both locally 
connected generation and demand side management, are increasing their penetration, 
displacing the traditional transmission managed operation of the network, and posing 
significant operational challenges to System Operators. 
This paper considers some of the implications of these developments for the 
future of electric utilities – including generating, retailing and network companies – as 
                                                 
1 Email dmgn@cam.ac.uk, +44 1223 335248, Faculty of Economics, Sidgwick Ave, Cambridge 
CB3 9DE, UK 
2 David Newbery is Director of the Energy Policy Research Group (EPRG) at Cambridge 
University. This paper has evolved considerably since early versions were presented in Daegu, 
Anchorage and Dusseldorf during my term as President in 2013, in New York in 2014 and at an 
FTI-CL workshop on Towards the Target Model 2.0. I have been much influenced by discussions 
with EPRG colleagues, stakeholders, Fabien Roques of EPRG’s conference sponsors FTI-CL, 
and meetings in MIT and Madrid, in particular the contributions of Ignacio Pérez-Arriaga. I am 
indebted to R-J Lange, Matti Liski and Adonis Yatchew for comments and encouragement.  
3  Newbery (2000, 2005, 2006, 2012a, 2013) 
4 Bergman et al. (1999)  
5  Galal et al. (1994), Newbery and Pollitt (1997), Pollitt (2012) and references therein. 
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well as the implications for the regulation of networks, both transmission and 
distribution. Policy-makers are responsible for market design and interventions needed to 
meet various objectives, ideally informed by both good principles and evidence. They 
and regulators have a key role to play in balancing the often conflicting objectives of 
efficiency (ensuring that the prices and incentives deliver the least cost outcomes), equity 
(protecting less well-off consumers, ensuring that tariffs and charges are ‘fair’ and 
acceptable), and innovation, which may entail what appear inefficient and possibly 
inequitable tariffs to promote new developments. Net metering is an example of a tariff 
structure that is both inefficient and inequitable, but which proponents argue is necessary 
to kick-start the move to a more decentralized electricity supply industry that empowers 
(some) consumers and creates learning and, perhaps, valuable social acceptability. A 
better example is support for renewable electricity above the value of carbon displaced, 
which is costly, often financed in unfair and inefficient ways, but can be justified for the 
learning benefits created (as demonstrated in the Appendix and Newbery, 2017). In both 
cases there are better ways of delivering these innovations. 
Two aspects of this more decentralized and decarbonized system are critical to the 
design of markets and regulation. Decarbonized generation is often characterized by high 
capital costs and low variable costs. Nuclear power, hydro-electricity, wind, both on- and 
off-shore, and solar power meet this description, although bio-energy and carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) have high variable costs. Second, rapid advances in Information and 
Communications Technologies (ICT) and the power of Moore’s Law (that information 
processing costs halve every 18-24 months) mean that the costs of communicating with 
and controlling units (generation and demand) are falling to the point where Distribution 
Networks Operators (DNOs) can take similar control powers as Transmission System 
Operators (TSOs), graduating to become Distribution System Operators (DSOs). New 
energy service firms can similarly aggregate smaller unit offerings into Virtual Power 
Plants and offer their services to System Operators (DSO and TSO).  This ICT revolution 
allows more active management of all networks, including those within buildings, and 
increasingly allows more granular pricing that better reflects the value or cost of power at 
each location and moment, ideally signaling least cost actions to those best placed to 
respond. 
The next section identifies the relevant theories needed to understand and address 
these challenges, while the remainder of the paper illustrates their application. 
 
2. RELEVANT THEORY 
The underlying assumption supporting liberalization is that markets deliver more efficient 
outcomes than bureaucrats. The conditions for market efficiency are demanding – a full 
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set of markets (current and future, including insurance markets6), no market power, no 
externalities and rational well-informed actors. The Electricity Supply Industry (ESI) is, 
unfortunately for this claim, characterized by missing markets, market power and 
externalities (Newbery, 2016a; 2005; 2012a). Nevertheless, complete market theory can 
be helpful in designing markets and policies to address market failures, as illustrated 
below. 
The first principle is that externalities (greenhouse gas emissions, air pollutants, 
learning spill-overs) should be properly charged (via carbon taxes) or compensated (via 
suitable targeted subsidies). The EU Emissions Trading System is an attempt to confront 
major emitters with a price to be paid for CO2 emissions, and while some jurisdictions 
have similar schemes for sulphur dioxide and nitrogen oxides, others address these 
through emissions standards. The whole issue of compensating those who produce 
learning externalities is considered at greater length below. 
Transmission and distribution networks are natural monopolies that require 
regulation both to prevent consumer exploitation and investment protection, and as such 
efficient pricing will fail to cover their full cost. Their marginal operating costs are 
primarily losses, a tiny fraction of the total cost, and the larger part of efficient pricing is 
to address congestion through locational marginal pricing, (Schweppe et al., 1998). Even 
if that is employed (and Europe has yet to adopt it), and prices are on average equal to 
long-run marginal cost, there would still be a large shortfall to be recovered.  
If, as is likely, policy makers choose more reliable systems than would be 
supported by competitive wholesale markets and decentralized investment decisions, 
efficient pricing will result in a shortfall in generation capital costs that also needs to be 
recovered. Most of the promising renewable technologies create external learning 
benefits, while R&D creates public (knowledge) goods, neither of which is recovered by 
competitive pricing. In all these cases, efficient prices will not cover the full system costs 
and the shortfall will have to be collected, balancing the objectives of efficiency and 
equity, concepts that are central to modern public economics (as set out in e.g. Atkinson 
and Stiglitz, 1980, 2015). Efficiency dictates minimizing deadweight losses; equity 
tempers this by considering who bears these costs. While familiar to public economists, 
these principles seem less familiar to energy economists and policy makers. 
Transmission and distribution networks have an element of excludable public 
goods (sometimes called club goods) in that would-be beneficiaries can be excluded from 
access unless they pay the membership fee that covers the shortfall in revenue from 
efficient pricing. One of the oldest theories of the efficient supply of such public goods is 
the benefit principle, in that if agents could be persuaded to reveal the marginal value 
                                                 
6 This requirement can be relaxed to rational expectations combined with risk-neutrality 
(Newbery and Stiglitz, 1981). 
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they attach to an increment of supply, the sum of these marginal values would indicate 
the total benefit from the increment, which should be delivered if this exceeds the 
marginal cost (Samuelson, 1954). For network expansion it suggests that the beneficiaries 
should pay – e.g. via deep connection charging for new generation that would pay the 
cost of reinforcing the network to accept the infeed.7 In practice, it is often hard to 
identify all the beneficiaries, let alone determine their individual benefits, and some 
alternative way of collecting the revenue shortfall is required than voluntary 
contributions. 
Given its high capital cost and need for revenue recovery, it is not surprising that 
some of the most innovative ways of recovering revenue shortfalls were developed in the 
electricity industry. Marcel Boiteux (1956),8 when head of EdF, addressed the question 
of how a monopolist should set cost-recovering prices to minimize deadweight loss, a 
problem that Frank Ramsey (1927) had earlier addressed when designing indirect taxes. 
The Ramsey-Boiteux rule argues that the efficient taxes (or charges to make up the 
shortfall of revenue from pricing at marginal cost) should lead to equi-proportional 
reductions in all electricity service demands, thereby minimizing the total deadweight 
loss. In simple cases in which the price of one good does not affect the demand for the 
other goods supplied, the tax or mark-up should be proportional to the inverse elasticity 
of demand. Electricity markets offer a range of services with differing demand elasticities 
(for customers connected at different voltage levels, for connection relative to demand, 
for peak demand, and/or at different hours of the year) and charges that lead to equi-
proportional reductions in all these demands suggests higher mark-ups on capacity rather 
than consumption. 
The public economics principle for recovering revenue shortfalls is that the 
inevitable distortions needed to raise revenue above efficient pricing should fall on final 
consumers, and not distort production decisions (Diamond and Mirrlees, 1971). This is 
most relevant when recovering the costs of support for demonstration and deployment of 
renewables, which most countries levy on all electricity consumption without exempting 
producers. Germany exempts energy-intensive industries from their high green levies, 
which the Directorate-General for Competition, European Commission (DG COMP) 
argues, correctly, is discriminatory and hence not legal. The proper response is that all, 
not just energy-intensive, industries should be exempt, so there is no discrimination 
between industries. Again, there is a tension between “fairness” (all, particularly 
“wealthy” companies, should share the burden) and efficiency. In this case, consumers 
                                                 
7  There is an extensive literature on decision criteria for transmission expansion, ranging from 
the California ISO approach (Awad et al,, n.d.) to those that emphasise mechanism design to 
delegate decisions (Hogan et al., 2011; Rosellón &Weigt, 2011). 
8 Boiteux (1949) had earlier addressed the classic problem of peak load pricing, central not just to 
electricity pricing but of far more general economic interest. 
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ultimately bear the costs imposed on firms in the prices they face when buying from the 
firms, and it makes matters worse to amplify firms’ costs and hence raise prices with 
additional avoidable deadweight costs. Note also that industries should be charged for 
harmful externalities, e.g. via a carbon tax or emissions trading price, and there may be a 
second-best case for discriminating between industries that are exposed to international 
competition and those that are not in rebating carbon taxes (see e.g. Böhringer et al., 
2016). 
The deadweight cost of a tax increases as the square of the tax rate (Newbery, 
1990), so doubling the tax base and halving the tax rate halves the total deadweight cost. 
The final relevant public economics principles are that deadweight losses are minimized 
by broadening the range of goods on which the revenue is collected, and that equity is 
better addressed through taxes related to ability to pay (e.g. income) than through 
differential taxes on specific goods. That argues for a uniform rate of Value Added Tax 
(VAT) applied to all goods and services that falls only on final consumers (Atkinson and 
Stiglitz, 1980; Deaton and Stern, 1986). Subsidies to correct the competitive electricity 
market’s inability to finance external benefits should therefore be financed from general 
taxation, not by concentrating the levy on a single good (electricity) but by spreading it 
over all consumption or income, as all benefit from the externality benefits of future 
climate change mitigation. It also argues for imposing the standard rate of VAT on 
energy, rather than the lower rate adopted in some countries like the UK. Again, these 
principles run into political arguments of “fairness” (more properly expedience, where 
charges carry less emotive import than taxes, and raising taxes always attracts 
complaints, whereas leaving inefficient distortions in place rarely generates much reform 
pressure).  
The practical question is whether it is reasonable to rely on governments setting 
sensible taxes to address distributive justice, or whether they are so constrained by 
perception and party politics that ameliorative redistributive action is delegated to 
regulatory bodies charged to take account of fuel poverty and the like. Legislation that 
charges regulators to take account of distributional impacts is the almost inevitable 
consequence of an unwillingness of governments to take adequate responsibility for 
distributional justice. 
High capital costs make the cost of finance a major part of system costs. The 
amount and type of risk is a major determinant of the cost of capital, with the risk-free 
real rate of interest less than 2%, while the hurdle rate of return required to persuade 
developers to invest in some generation technologies over 10% real (DECC, 2013a). 
Principal-agent theory (e.g. Laffont and Tirole, 1993) balances the incentive effects of 
allocating decisions to those with the best information and best placed to manage the 
risks against the cost of bearing that risk. The cost of risk increases as the square of the 
deviation and its impact of the bearer’s total consumption risk, and so depends on the 
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extent to which it is correlated with other risks, and the number of agents over whom it 
can be spread. Sharing the risk equally between two identical agents halves the total cost 
of the risk.9 That is an argument for spreading any market risks either over a large 
number of shareholders (particularly if the risk is uncorrelated with aggregate stock 
market risk, like wind output) or over final consumers, for each of whom the resulting 
increase in the variability in total consumption is small. Transferring all the risk to 
consumers for whom the cost is least may, however, reduce the agent’s incentive to 
manage and reduce the risk efficiently. 
The theory of the firm and its foundation in transaction cost economics (Coase, 
1937; Williamson, 1981, 1985) constrains what business models are likely to be viable as 
services become increasingly decentralized and their values smaller. Business models not 
only need to deliver profits larger than these transaction costs, but are vulnerable if they 
exploit price differences that are a creature of either currently imperfect charging or 
inefficient tax-like methods of cost recovery. This is probably most obvious for the 
various direct and indirect supports for domestic solar PV, and perhaps less obvious in 
the case of electric vehicles, where high road fuel duties effectively subsidize untaxed 
electricity used in the electric vehicles. Road pricing that replaced fuel duties as a better 
way of charging for road use would remove that distortion and reduce the attraction of 
electric vehicles (Newbery and Strbac, 2016). 
Networks differ from normal markets in which buyers and sellers interact directly, 
in that they can offer a platform for intermediaries to connect agents, each of which offers 
the other network benefits. Such two-sided markets have been greatly facilitated by the 
ICT revolution, and are exemplified by credit card companies (e.g. Visa, Mastercard), 
who offer attractive forms of payment to buyers thus making sellers who honour their 
cards more attractive to the buyers. A larger customer base for the platform provider 
confers more network benefits and creates economies of scale, often leading to intense 
competition and market concentration. The importance for firm behaviour is that the 
nature of the network benefits conditions the business models and pricing schemes that 
are viable. Weiller and Pollitt (2014) explore how the electricity supply industry (ESI) 
                                                 
9 Adding a project with a random outcome X to underlying (random) income (or wealth), W, and 
expanding the resulting utility function  U(W+X) around its initial value in a second order Taylor 
expansion (normalizing U' = 1 to measure utility in money units but retaining risk aversion, i.e. 
U″<0) causes an increase the agent’s income of ΔEU ≈ EX(1 – R[½σx2 (EX/EW) +  ρ σwσx]), where R 
= -W U"/U', the dimensionless coefficient of relative risk aversion, ρ is the correlation coefficient of 
the risky project income with original income, σw is the coefficient of variation (CV) of income, and 
σx is the CV of the risky project.  Highly correlated risk (high ρ) raises the cost, while uncorrelated 
risks can be diversified.  If a project uncorrelated with income (ρ = 0) is divided among n identical 
agents, each receives a value ΔEU ≈ E(X/n) - ½(R/EW)σw2(EX/n)2  and the total value is nΔEU ≈ 
E(X) - ½(R/EW)σw2(EX)2/n.  The total cost of risk has therefore decreased by a factor n. 
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can be viewed as a platform-mediated, two-sided market and the consequences for 
business models for aggregating decentralized DER. 
2.1 Special features of electricity 
Although electricity might seem the archetype of a single homogenous product 
(all electrons look the same), the ESI delivers a range of different services including the 
delivery of energy (kWh), of capacity for reliably meeting demands (kW), as well as the 
quality of power at a particular location. Its wholesale value is therefore made up of the 
energy value (kWh), the value of reliability (i.e., the ability to meet demand) provided by 
capacity (kW), and quality of service (voltage stability, frequency, reactive power, etc.) 
which is provided by a range of ancillary services.  The pricing of delivered electricity 
also represents a bundled service made up of the wholesale cost, transmission and 
distribution costs, as well as retailing, contracting with, and metering the customer. 
Electricity is characterized by a range of particular demand and supply features 
which distinguish it from other products. The key physical challenge is that supply must 
equal demand at all nodes of the system in real time, which can be facilitated by storage 
to a limited extent (it is expensive, therefore of modest size, and does not automatically 
balance supply and demand without intervention). The demand for electricity shows 
substantial volatility on an hourly, daily and seasonal basis. At the same time, most 
demand is largely unresponsive to prices in the short run since most consumers do not see 
the cost of their electricity in anything close to real time, although intelligent active 
demand management may alter this. Even given smart meters, many customers may have 
a preference against having to respond quickly to rapidly varying prices. For related 
reasons, consumers’ true willingness to pay for electricity services is difficult to measure. 
2.2 Efficient pricing of capacity-constrained production under uncertainty 
Electricity generating units have well-defined capacities, but some probability of failure, 
so that to meet an acceptable standard of reliability, some reserve margin will be 
required. Different units have often very different variable costs, and the least cost 
dispatch ranks plant in order of increasing short-run marginal cost (SRMC), with that of 
the last plant dispatched setting the System Marginal Cost (SMC). The efficient price 
must also reflect scarcity (the value of the capacity in meeting the reliability standard) 
and any other costs directly involved in delivering power of the right quality to final 
consumers. If we ignore this last qualification, the efficient price is P = (1 – LoLP)*SMC 
+ LoLP*VoLL, where LoLP is the instantaneous Loss of Load Probability and VoLL is 
the Value of Lost Load. The first term is the marginal cost of delivering power if there is 
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no loss of load, and the second term is the value of the power if there is a loss of load, 
each multiplied by their event probability. The terms can be rearranged to give  
P = SMC + LoLP*(VoLL-SMC),       (1) 
where the first term is now just the short-run marginal cost of generating the power and 
the second term is a capacity payment to remunerate the capacity kept available to 
provide reliability.  
If the system is in efficient long-run equilibrium with exactly the right 
combination of plant of differing costs to meet the time pattern of variable demand, and if 
there are constant returns at the scales at which the plants are chosen, then setting this 
efficient spot price will cover the costs of the entire generation fleet.10 In practice, given 
the risk aversion of either the utility (if it is allowed to recover its “justified” costs) or the 
regulator/politician charged with ensuring reliability, whose necks are on the line if the 
lights go out but who can recover the costs from electricity consumers, there is a 
tendency to overcapacity, in which case this efficient price will not recover total costs. 
This has implications for the need for, and design of, capacity remuneration mechanisms 
discussed below. 
 
                                                 
10 The efficient portfolio of plant is determined using screening curves as set out in e.g. Stoft 
(2002), who also establishes this standard result for the case of electricity wholesale markets. 
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2.3 Charging for ancillary services  
Vertically integrated generation and transmission utilities supply a bundled 
product of energy, reliability and quality of service, and so do not need to explicitly pay 
their generating units for the ancillary services to deliver quality. With unbundling and 
ownership separation, some services are explicitly paid through the balancing market or 
mechanism, some, like black start, are contracted and paid, but others become 
obligations under the grid codes and connection agreements, often not explicitly 
rewarded. As the share of intermittent generation rises, and with it an increase in non-
synchronous penetration,11 so new flexibility services are needed to maintain quality 
and need to be remunerated if investment decisions are to be efficiently guided. 
Investors deciding on the type of generating plant to build need to balance the increased 
cost of greater flexibility against the revenues they may earn, and if markets or 
payments for these services are missing, then the cost of maintaining quality with the 
wrong portfolio of generating assets will be higher (CEER, 2016; Newbery, 2016a). As 
some of these flexibility services can be provided by modern HVDC interconnectors, it 
becomes important that they are also compensated and allowed to offer these services 
(which may be at the expense of selling their entire capacity ahead of time to wheel 
power). 
 
2.4 Capacity remuneration mechanisms 
The case for a capacity auction has been cogently argued,12 not least in the 
discussion papers13 that set out the reasons for the British Electricity Market Reform 
delivered in the Energy Act, 2013 (HMG, 2013). The case rests on two main arguments. 
The first is the standard one that prices are not allowed to rise to the value of lost load,14 
so there is a missing money problem. That can be addressed by contracts, specifically 
Reliability Options. The second problem is that of missing markets – for various 
flexibility services (again, remediable) but more fundamental is the lack of adequately 
distant futures and risk markets for investors to hedge risk. That might not matter if 
investors were confident that they faced only the normal commercial risks that large 
                                                 
11 Conventional rotating generation turbines are synchronised to the grid frequency and have 
substantial inertia, so that if there is a momentary loss of supply, that inertia prevents the 
frequency falling too fast. Wind power has effectively no inertia, which has to be provided in 
some form to maintain frequency within acceptable limits. 
12 See e.g. Newbery and Grubb (2015) and the extensive references therein, including the EEEP 
Symposium on ‘Capacity Markets’ (Joskow, 2013). 
13 e.g. DECC (2010). 
14 The day-ahead European auction has a price cap of €3,000/MWh, well below the VoLL, and a 
price that has already been reached in some markets. The System Operator in GB supplies 
emergency services at £6,000/MWh, while the GB VoLL is £17,000/MWh. 
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well-capitalized electricity utilities are willing to accept (although at a suitably high 
hurdle discount rate), but energy policy has become increasingly politicized. It is 
difficult to predict future climate change and renewables policy, to mention just two 
kinds of policy that impact utility profitability. The lack of future risk markets makes 
investment in peaking plant that may run a small but highly variable number of hours at 
hard to predict prices (that are in any case capped) unduly risky and hence 
unnecessarily costly. 
  
2.5 Setting regulated tariffs 
Transmission and distribution (T&D) accounts for a large share of investment needed, 
globally amounting to 43% of total electricity investment from 2012-35 (IEA, 2012). The 
forecast share of distribution in total investment is 32%, nearly three times the share of 
transmission. The demands for T&D investment increase with the share of Renewable 
Electricity Supply (RES), as fossil generation can typically be located closer to final 
demand, economizing on the additional T&D requirements. As natural monopolies, T&D 
tariffs are set by regulators and ought to be cost-reflective. What is striking looking 
across Europe is the considerable variety in network costs and, less surprisingly, taxes 
and levies to recover renewables and other activities, shown in Figure 1 for domestic 
consumers. A similar range can be found for industrial consumers at comparable voltages 
and volumes (MWh/yr). 
 
Figure 1 Build-up of final domestic electricity prices in selected EU countries, 2012 
Source: DECC (2013b) and ACER (2013) 
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Tariffs need to be set to encourage efficient investment in and use of the 
networks, but also to recover any shortfalls in revenue remaining after setting tariffs at 
their efficient levels. Efficient pricing means setting the prices at each node on the 
network at the locational marginal price, LMP (Schweppe et al., 1998), as in many 
transmission areas in the U.S. Even if transmission and distribution systems are 
efficiently sized and priced, they are unlikely to cover more than a quarter of total costs 
(Pérez Arriaga, et al., 1995; Rubio-Oderiz et al., 2000). As LMPs are not (yet) used in 
Europe, at best marginal transmission losses would be covered. Almost all the remaining 
costs are fixed and in need of recovery. As a result, network utilities have to set prices 
above the efficient (LMP) level at least some of the time to recover fixed costs. 
The solution practiced by many utilities, exemplified by EdF under Boiteux, was 
“cost-reflective” pricing,15 to charge for transmission at peak hours (on the argument that 
the transmission system was sized to deliver the peak demand). In Britain, National Grid 
charges Distribution Networks Operators (DNOs) on their demands on the transmission 
system in Triad half-hours – the three half-hours separated by at least 10 days of system 
maximum demand. While peak demands might drive transmission expansion, economies 
of scale imply that efficient peak pricing will still lead to revenue shortfalls that should be 
targeted to reduce all demands equi-proportionally. Just charging for the peak demand in 
three half-hours will likely lead to inefficiencies.  
High peak demand charges at the grid supply point to the DNO (which are then 
passed on to the meters of larger customers) encourage both DNOs and these customers 
to embed generation behind the metering points and claim an embedded benefit (for 
reducing the peak charges). This problem became particularly acute in Britain as the cost-
recovery element in transmission charges rose from modest levels (£10/kWyr) to high 
levels (£60/kWyr) with the massive investment in off-shore links to wind-farms and to 
strengthen connections to Scotland to evacuate on-shore wind. This, when combined with 
capacity payments (discussed below) has over-encouraged inefficiently-sized distributed 
generation behind the meter. The excess cost of inefficient T&D tariffs has thus recently 
become very high (Newbery, 2016b; Ofgem, 2017). 
The principles set out above argue that the shortfall in T&D should be collected 
from final consumers, not net of any generation, as producers (i.e. all generators, not just 
embedded generators and regardless of the voltage level at which they are connected) 
                                                 
15 There is some ambiguity about the meaning of “cost-reflective”, which might include charges 
that are proportional to marginal costs, or even the average cost of expansion. The Australian 
Energy Market Commission has recently published a clarification of their principles of what the 
required cost-reflective tariffs mean, and specifically that “Each network tariff must be based on 
the long-run marginal cost of providing the service.” (Emphasis added, see 
http://www.utilitymagazine.com.au/cost-reflective-pricing-giving-consumers-the-power-of-
choice/ ). This would seem to allow mark-ups on the marginal cost. 
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should face efficient prices to guide their choice (of location, size, type, etc.). The 
challenge of finding efficient prices on local networks where their specific topology can 
lead to large differences across small geographic areas should not be underestimated 
(MIT, 2016). 
 The cost-recovery element levied on gross consumption should reduce demands 
by an equal proportion (which will require higher proportional mark-ups for the less 
elastic demands such as for the size of connection or fuse). British DNOs set higher 
tariffs in the afternoon peak hours in the winter period for domestic consumers as 
arguably those hours have the most inelastic demand. If revenue shortfalls are recovered 
by additional energy charges, net metering of e.g. solar PV is distorting, and excessively 
encourages sub-scale renewables, as well as being highly inequitable if the PV subsidies 
are paid for by the consumers without PV (typically less well-off).  
Network connections offer the option of taking power when any local sources are 
not contributing and as such should be paid for. If customers can specify the maximum 
amount they would like to be able to take at any moment and if this can be measured (and 
excesses charged at a suitable penal rate), then this would be a candidate for cost-
recovering charges. Similarly, the principle of deep connection charging that applies to 
large distribution-connected generation in GB could also be applied to new loads (e.g. 
computer server farms) seeking connection, encouraging efficient location and reducing 
the shortfall in network expansion costs to be recovered. Improved network modeling, the 
move from DNO to DSO, better metering and ICT makes more granular and more 
efficient pricing increasingly practical. 
  
3. SUPPORTING RENEWABLES 
The European Commission, among other agencies, has pressed for renewables 
targets (which require subsidies for their support), primarily to reduce greenhouse gas 
emissions but also to promote growth, employment, innovation and the renewables 
industries.16 The numerous documents setting out the principles for support are mostly 
silent on the reasons why supporting renewables, rather than just reducing greenhouse 
gas emissions, should be singled out, and most of the reasons, other than mitigating 
climate change, are dubious at best. This matters, as until the objectives of a policy are 
clearly stated and defended, it is hard to judge whether the policies chosen to support 
them are efficient, justified and proportional. 
The main case for supporting different renewable energy technologies is that 
their deployment drives down costs through learning by doing and induced technical 
progress. If technology developers can see a viable market for their products, they will 
                                                 
16 See e.g. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_MEMO-16-3987_en.htm  
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be encouraged to research, develop, test, and, if the results are promising, scale up 
production to drive down costs. The resulting cost reductions are typically measured by 
the learning rate – the proportional drop in cost per unit for a doubling of the installed 
capacity. While there is uncertainty not only about past learning rates (Rubin et al., 
2015) but clearly about future rates17 and even their attribution to deployment or R&D 
(Jamasb, 2007; Nordhaus, 2014), the learning rates for some technologies like solar PV 
seem impressive. ITRPV (2016), which as an industry source may be more optimistic, 
claims the continuation of a 21% learning rate for PV modules for an installed base of 
227 GWp.18 This is consistent with Rubin et al. (2015) for one-factor models that 
attribute all cost reductions to deployment, while two-factor models that separately 
identify R&D lower this figure to 12% (Rubin et al., 2015, table 1). On-shore wind has 
a lower one-factor mean learning rate of 12% and a two-factor learning rate of 9.6%. 
Gas turbines have a one-factor rate of 14%, but the two-factor learning rate is much 
lower at 1.4%, and the installed base is so large that to double it would require truly 
massive investment. In contrast, the 2015 annual rate of PV installation was 50 GWp or 
28% of the installed base, which alone could cause a current cost reduction of 6%/yr.  
  
3.1 Assessing the social profitability of supporting solar PV 
 
The Global Apollo Programme (King et al., 2015) calls for a global effort to 
combat climate change, including support to drive down the cost of zero-carbon 
generation. Given the range of different zero-carbon options (nuclear, wind, solar PV, 
etc.) how does one decide when one option merits continued support and when to 
abandon that technology and concentrate on others. As an illustration of assessing 
whether it is worth supporting solar PV (which until recently appeared very expensive), 
the Appendix sets out a simplified social cost-benefit analysis, asking the question, 
starting from 2015,19 does it make sense to continue to subsidize PV to accelerate the 
date at which it is cheaper than fossil fuel alternatives? (Newbery, 2017 provides a 
fuller exposition.)  
The evidence reviewed in the Appendix suggests that even although PV has 
only recently become cost-competitive in favourable locations (sunny summer-peaking 
systems with high air-conditioning loads), if the learning rates are both attributable to 
increasing cumulative production and likely to continue at comparable rates in the 
future, then the global case for supporting that expansion seems reasonably solid, but 
                                                 
17 Which may be better modelled as an assembly of components each of which is subject to 
different learning rates – see Rubin et al. (2015) and references therein. 
18 Subscript p refers to peak output; average output can be above 25% in favoured locations like 
the South-West of the US, or as low as 10% in Northern Europe. 
19 NREL (2016) gives recent cost and performance data. 
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unless a region (like China, or the EU) captures a sufficiently large share of the benefits 
or has a particularly favourable resource (sun) the selfishly regional benefits may not be 
sufficient to justify the subsidy cost. What is also clear is that it is much cheaper to 
provide this support in sunny locations, but also very difficult for the subsidies to be 
globally mobilized and then channeled to the best places. An additional problem is that 
local saturation requires complementary investment in flexibility services and stronger 
interconnections, both of which raise many of the concerns addressed in this article. 
 
3.2 Designing renewables support schemes 
 
The main case for supporting renewables is to reap the learning benefits that  are 
hard for the developers to capture (the solar PV and wind turbine markets are intensely 
competitive) and so they primarily benefit subsequent installations. Even if the 
improvements could be patented and licensed, there would be a strong case for making 
these technologies available without a license fee to encourage their take-up and resulting 
climate change mitigation, so directly supporting deployment (and R&D) is preferable to 
license fees. Figure 2 illustrates the apparent persistence of Swanson’s “Law” - that 
modules decrease in price by 20% for every doubling of cumulative shipped modules 
(shown as the straight line). The other line (with square markers) shows world-wide 
module shipments vs. average module price, from 1976 ($104/Wp) to 2015 ($0.58/Wp) in 
2015 dollars. The actual decrease suggests a learning rate slightly greater than 20%,20 a 
view supported by Fraunhofer (2016). 
                                                 
20 Fig. 2 graphs data from ITRPV (2015) and can be updated from ITRPV (2016, fig. 46). 
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Figure 2 Cost reductions and capacity expansion in solar PV modules 
Source: Delphi234 - Own work, CC0, 
https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=33955173  
 
The second case for support extends to all low or zero-carbon technologies in the 
absence of an adequate, durable and credible carbon price, and can be addressed either 
directly by a Carbon Price Support (CPS, as in Britain),21 somewhat indirectly and more 
bluntly through emissions performance standards that discourage investment in carbon-
intensive generation, or in a second-best world, by subsidizing the output of low-carbon 
generation by the short-fall in the efficient price set by more carbon-intensive generation. 
The two arguments lead to quite different support mechanisms. The second would 
effectively be a carbon credit per MWh, for administrative simplicity probably based on a 
suitably RES output-weighted estimate of the carbon intensity of generation averaged 
over a year.22 To take an example if the marginal carbon intensity is 0.9 tonne CO2/MWh 
                                                 
21 The CPS raises the cost of CO2 emissions from electricity generation up to a pre-specified 
level. The additional carbon tax (added to the ETS price) was set at £14.86 per tCO2 for 2016/17 
(HoC, 2016). 
22 http://www.ukenergywatch.org/Electricity/Realtime gives the instantaneous RES and total 
generation output and generation carbon intensity in real time for the UK. More accurately, one 
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and the shortfall in carbon price is $20/tonne CO2, zero intensity plant would receive a 
payment of $18/MWh. 
The first, and specifically renewables case for support, suggests that the market 
failure to be addressed is the unremunerated spill-over from investments that leads to 
learning and cost reductions. The implication, consistent with the EC Clean Energy 
(“Winter”) Package,23 is to target support on the investment rather than its output, and 
then allow the installation to sell electricity in the market like any other generator (with 
the addition of the carbon price correction mentioned above). The most elegant way to do 
this is to hold an auction for the support needed for the full capacity hours specified, e.g. 
for on-shore wind, China offers support for 30,000 hours (Steinhilber, 2016), i.e. for 
30,000 MWh/MW installed capacity, which in good locations would be reached in 11-13 
years. 
The advantage of this is that for the developer the revenue stream of this support 
is highly predictable and hence can be used as collateral for debt finance, the cheapest 
form and hence lowering the cost of RES generation. An auction determines the least cost 
way of meeting the auction target (which can be specified in terms of MW capacity, or 
for a budget). The form of support does not over-reward favoured resource areas (of high 
wind or sun), as the aim is to support the delivery of capacity, not energy.24 This in turn 
means that the primary determinant of location is the local wholesale price and the 
network costs, which, as 90% of EU renewables are connected to distribution systems 
(EC, 2016), are the DNO tariffs and connection charges. With nodal (LMP) pricing, as 
more developers locate in a favoured location, the local wholesale price will decrease and 
discourage further renewables at that location, and hence mitigate excessive network 
reinforcement costs. Even without nodal pricing, if, as in some countries (e.g. on 
distribution networks in GB) there are deep connection charges or use-of-system charges 
that reflect underlying LMPs, this will again encourage efficient least-system cost 
connections. 
Newbery (2016b) provides an example to demonstrate the distortionary effects of 
subsidizing output rather than capacity. Suppose distant wind runs 2,500 hrs/yr and closer 
wind only 2,000 hrs/yr with an average wholesale price of $40/MWh and an additional 
                                                                                                                                                 
would like an estimate of the marginal carbon intensity – the amount of CO2 displaced by the 
extra RES set by the marginal plant in each time period. Depending on the relative prices of gas 
or coal that could be either a CCGT at the margin (0.367 tCO2/MWh) or, more probably, coal at 
0.973 tCO2/MWh (averages for the UK, 2016). 
23 At http://ec.europa.eu/energy/en/news/commission-proposes-new-rules-consumer-centred-
clean-energy-transition, which has links to various proposed directives and regulations. 
24 Compare two sites, one which produces 2,000 full wind hours per year, the other 2,500 hours. 
If the discount rate is 5% real, and each is given the same price per MWh for 15 years, the 
windier site is given 25% more than the less windy site, but if each is given 30,000 full hours then 
the windier site is only given 6.7% more. 
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RES support of $40/MWh (either by a green certificate valued at $40/MWh or a Feed-in 
Tariff of $80/MWh). The extra transmission use-of-system cost is, however, $25/kWyr 
for the distant location compared to the closer one. The extra value of the distant wind is 
$40/MWh x 500hrs = $20,000/MWyr, $20/kWyr, but after deducting the additional 
transmission cost, its extra value is negative, making the closer wind more valuable from 
a systems viewpoint. The additional financial attractiveness of distant wind (at $80/MWh 
x 500hrs) is $40/kWyr, which is higher than the extra $25/kWyr transmission charge and 
so the windier site will be inefficiently chosen. The earlier EC Renewables Directive 
(2009/28/EC) specified the 2020 renewables target as a share of total energy, which 
encourages supporting energy rather than capacity, and to that extent was poorly 
designed. A preferable solution that would also address the concern of the EC 2017 
Clean Energy Package to promote the efficient location of RES across the EU, would be 
to specify the RES support obligation in terms of a share of GDP. 
The next section illustrates how these principles can be applied in an example. 
 
4. ILLUSTRATIONS FROM “ANDIA” 
 Andia, a fictitious country with a strong resemblance to Peru, is an example 
intended to bring out features of a system with high capital and very low variable costs, 
and as such indicative of a future facing an increasing number of utilities. The questions 
to be addressed are how wholesale, T&D and retail prices should be set, and what the 
economics of renewable energy are. 
Andia is a small isolated system with a large amount of run-of-river hydro and 
about 3 GW of storage hydro (in a 7 GW peaking system) that has less than four months’ 
storage capacity. Recently discovered associated gas allows nearly half electricity 
demand to be met from gas, with the rest from hydro. The hydrocarbon field, which is far 
from demand centres and the sea, produces gas as a by-product of the liquids extracted. 
In order to realize its value the field is connected by pipeline to a liquefaction plant to 
export LNG and then along the coast to demand centres and gas-fired power stations.25  
The LNG plant (the only export facility in Latin America) is running at full 
capacity, so the only alternative use of the gas, other than in power generation, is to 
reinject it for later use, either when there is spare capacity in exporting or adequate 
domestic demand. Its opportunity cost is therefore low – effectively the present value of 
its future use, which, if the export constraint cannot be relaxed, might be more than a 
decade hence.26 If its export netback value into the LNG facility were $US 1.9/mmBTU, 
                                                 
25 See Honoré (2016) for maps and other information on Peruvian gas. 
26 Peru has some non-associated gas which can therefore set a higher commodity price, and the 
average gas price paid by thermal facilities in 2014 had risen to $US 3.2/mmBTU. Since then gas 
prices have declined considerably (Honoré, 2016, fig 52) and seem set to remain low. 
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and exports could only be expanded with a delay of five years, its value today 
discounting at 10% real would be only $4/MWhth,27 which would give a fuel cost of 
$11/MWhe in an Open Cycle Gas Turbine (OCGT) or $8/MWhe in a CCGT.28  
Other variable costs might add $4-5/MWhe, to which should be added the cost of 
climate change damage as a carbon price. The US EPA (2016) estimated the social cost 
of carbon (which depends on the rate of discount) in 2015 at $(2016) 42/tonne CO2, with 
a range from $13-$65/tonne. That may be on the high side for an internationally agreed 
acceptable price, but in making investment decisions it is the future average value that 
matters, for which $25/tonne may be a defensible figure under a Climate Change 
Agreement. This would add $14/MWhe for an OCGT and $9/MWhe for an efficient 
CCGT. Collecting these various cost elements, the variable costs of an OCGT might be 
$30/MWhe and $22//MWhe for an efficient CCGT.29 These can be contrasted with the 
variable costs of operating on diesel of $240/MWhe (including $20/MWhe for CO2), or 8-
10 times that of gas. Of course, the fixed costs of the gas infrastructure (any processing 
plant to recover the associated gas and the costly pipeline) still need to be recovered as a 
capacity charge (sometimes concealed in a take-or-pay contract which effectively makes 
almost all the costs fixed). That will be included in the capacity charge estimated below. 
If we look ahead to a time when the plant mix is in long-run equilibrium, using 
screening curves to select the least cost method of meeting any level of demand, we find 
that the optimal plant mix is very sensitive to fuel, carbon, O&M and fixed costs of the 
various plant types and sizes. Taking data from BEIS (2016),30 diesel plant might be 
cheapest for the most expensive 25 hours per year, OCGT for 1,100 hrs, while CCGT 
runs on baseload until partially displaced (but still price-setting) by run-of-river 
hydropower (except in those hours when run-of-rive output exceeds demand, in which 
hours energy prices would fall to zero – a possibility ignored here). The diesel generator 
(and all other generators) would need to be paid its fixed cost of $75/kWyr to enter the 
market (the cost of new entry), but then the system marginal cost, SMC, would cover the 
                                                 
27 The medium-run price of LNG from the west coast of Latin America seems likely to be set by 
the cost of US shale gas, as contracts are typically indexed to Henry Hub prices. US shale gas 
apparently has a very flat supply curve and large reserves. 
28 Subscript th for the thermal content of the gas and subscript e per MWh of electricity produced. 
Netback based on a landed price in destinations of $6.30/mmBTU (higher than current, e.g. 
exporting to Chile), and LNG shipping costs of $1.4/mmBTU + 6% loss, LNG plant costs of 
$1000/tonnes/yr capacity, 10% loss, $30/tonne O&M, regas costs of $0.30/mmBTU. 
29 Without a carbon charge, more OCGT would be installed and less CCGT, the OCGT would run 
more hours setting the energy price at $16/MWh and the CCGT would be only slightly cheaper at 
$13/MWh, so carbon pricing has (as intended) significant impacts on investment and carbon 
intensity in the long run. 
30 Taking the high cost 2018 costs for a 1,500 MW type F CCHT and a 400 MW OCGT, and their 
associated fixed and variable costs, from BEIS (2016, Table 19), assuming 10% cost of capital, 
15 yr life for diesel and 25 yrs for gas turbines. 
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excess fixed costs of the more efficient plant by the construction of the screening curves. 
If the value of lost load (VoLL) is $3/kWh,31 then the implied Loss of Load Expectation 
(LoLE) is $75/$3 = 25 hours per year on average.  
Suppose that Andia faces El Niño/La Niña rainfall conditions with low rainfall 
and inadequate hydro power once every four years and abundant rain also once every 
four years. Figure 3 shows the annual rainfall and hydro capacity factor over a long 
period for Peru. Interestingly the capacity factor has been rising, which might suggest 
that seasonality is becoming less significant, perhaps as dam capacity increases. Given 
our simplifying assumptions for the hypothetical Andia, the expected LoLE in rainy years 
might then be zero, 25 hrs in normal years and 50 hrs in dry years, with corresponding 
average annual energy prices of $23.6/MWh, $30.1/MWh and $40.6/MWh. These energy 
prices will need to be uplifted by capacity payments as in equation (1) to give the 
wholesale price.  
  
Figure 3 Rainfall and hydro-electric generation in Peru, 1980-2012 
Source: http://sdwebx.worldbank.org/climateportal 
 
The efficient wholesale price in this system is thus likely to be fairly low most of 
the time ($22/MWh) but high ($240/MWh) or very high ($3,000/MWh) in scarcity hours. 
The spot price in periods of controlled disconnections would rise to the VoLL, 
$3,000/MWh, but consumers would want contractual insurance against such high prices. 
                                                 
31  Scaling in proportion to GDP/hd. Peru has $(PPP) 12,500/hd and Ireland $(PPP) 65,000/hd. 
Ireland has a VoLL of $16/kWh. 
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That is most sensibly provided by Reliability Options (ROs) priced at something above 
the likely variable cost of the most expensive supply (diesel), or perhaps $300/MWh 
(Vázquez et al, 2002). The System Operator (or other designated body) would then 
determine the amount of capacity needed to meet the reliability standard and then auction 
the ROs. The RO contract would pay the successful generator the auction clearing price, 
in return for the generator paying back the spot price less the RO strike price (e.g. 
$300/MWh) if generating, and the spot price if not, providing powerful incentives for 
availability in stress hours.  
Thus in 25 hours per year a fully reliable diesel generator would only earn 
$60/MWh instead of the required $3,000/MWh needed to cover its full costs, so the 
shortfall in fixed costs would be $2.94/kWh x 25 hrs = $73.5/kWyr. This would be the 
net cost of new entry (assuming no other revenue from ancillary services). It would set 
the RO auction clearing price and that would be the amount of money to recover from 
consumers as part of wholesale electricity costs. If this is simply added to the SMC the 
annual average electricity costs would increase by $8.4/MWh to $38.3/MWh, but on 
scarcity grounds, the capacity charge would be doubled in dry years and zero in wet 
years, encouraging demand side response when most needed in the dry years. As a fixed 
cost the aim is to set charges to reduce demands for all services, capacity and energy, by 
the same proportion. The ex-ante chosen maximum demand (the amount covered by the 
RO contract) might be the least elastic demand and hence the target for most of the cost 
recovery. Clearly it cannot all be recovered in stress hours as the intent of the contract is 
to reduce price spikes. As a rough estimate, suppose the fixed costs were spread over the 
top quarter of demand hours, then the average wholesale price in those hours would be 
$89.90/MWh, with the remaining hours only $22/MWh. 
There are several assumptions that could be relaxed. Hydropower is very capital 
intensive but conceivably less so than the cost of pipelines and/or transmission lines to 
reach some areas, but in the well interconnected parts of the country that can be accessed 
from existing gas pipelines, gas-fired generation is likely to be cheaper than additional 
hydro. In other parts of the country weak and costly transmission links may make other 
generation technologies cheaper (and by implication, more expensive than the estimates 
above). 
The estimates above assumed no ancillary service profits, which would reduce the 
fixed costs as it would be paid directly by users. Storage hydro, however, is likely to be 
able to offer most of these at very low additional cost. Storage in dams would be 
preferentially retained for use at daily peak hours and thus allow prices to be stabilized 
over the day and perhaps week, but not for the whole year given the equilibrium choice 
of total capacity, giving rise to periods of controlled disconnection and high prices (where 
some water may be retained for an even worse future moment). Transmission constraints 
are likely to fragment the market and lead to higher local prices in some hours. 
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4.1 The case for renewable electricity 
We can now return to one of the original questions and investigate the price that 
wind or other renewables might face and hence their economics. The case for subsidizing 
renewables in wealthy countries is that it will stimulate cost reductions, some part of 
which can be internalized within the club agreeing the support (e.g. the EU via the 
Renewables Directive), as well as correcting for the underpricing of CO2. A small poor 
country can hardly be expected to provide subsidies for either reason, assuming, as here, 
that carbon is properly priced, although as argued above and in the Appendix, there is a 
powerful case for the club (ideally global, as envisaged by the Apollo Programme) 
financing PV deployment in high insolation areas such as Peru, where the required 
subsidy is likely to be lower. In short, the renewables in Andia should be eligible for 
support by, and count towards the renewables share of, the club of countries supporting 
renewables via the Apollo Programme. 
The average SMC over a run of years is just $30.7/MWh. Fortunately with 
storage hydro wind and PV can offer its capacity factor (perhaps 25+% in both cases)32 
and thus receive that fraction of the capacity payment (here $66/kWyr). In the US PV 
power purchase agreements have been signed for 20 years at less than US$ 40/MWh 
(indexed, without “meaningful tax state credits”, EPRI, 2016, fn 6), so with favourable 
(international concessional loans) PV would seem to be competitive against the relevant 
grid-connected average wholesale value of $47.2/MWh. Off-grid could be more attractive 
if it displaced diesel or has access to local storage hydro.  
4.2  Recovering fixed network costs  
Developing countries such as Andia will likely be incurring high costs rolling out 
networks to increase domestic electricity penetration. Setting network tariffs faces a 
direct trade-off between equity and efficiency, as the oldest and therefore more amortized 
networks will be in urban centres, while smaller villages will have newer and, per capita, 
more costly networks. The benefit principle of network finance might suggest that the 
incremental cost of transmission to new demands should be paid for by those demands 
while new generation would pay the deep connection costs (the increased network costs 
of evacuating the power), encouraging efficient location. These deep connection charges 
would be amortized over a period as a mortgage, with the property rights held by the 
generator, available to transfer to others wishing the same entry capacity. Such property 
rights give efficient entry and exit signals, in contrast to annual charges that can be 
                                                 
32 Insolation in parts of Peru appears as good as the best locations in the southern US, where the 
CF for tracking grid-scale systems can be above 25% (see Appendix and Bolinger et al. 2016). 
Insolation data is available at http://solarelectricityhandbook.com/solar-irradiance.html.  
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avoided by exit. As the long-run marginal cost of network expansion is likely well below 
the average cost, the shortfall can be collected according to the public finance principles 
set out above.  
The simplest and “fairest” approach would be uniform cost recovery of this 
shortfall across the country via uniform (spatial, not temporal) network tariffs on final 
consumption added on to nodal prices. One could go further in collecting proportionally 
more from urban areas that are richer and probably enjoy higher reliability than rural 
areas, on the benefit principle of charging that the rich are willing to pay a higher price 
for access to power than the poor. In short, the one principle that is hard to justify is to set 
end-user tariffs in proportion to the average cost of connecting them, although a proper 
social cost benefit analysis of expanding the network will clearly have to take account of 
all costs and benefits. 
As almost all network costs are fixed, Ramsey-Boiteux charging would lead to 
equi-proportional reductions in all demands (hourly and capacity) passed through to final, 
not net, consumption. That would mean in periods and locations where the network is 
unconstrained, the retail energy price would be the wholesale price uplifted by marginal 
transmission losses in transmission and distribution. Average losses might be 10%,33 
raising the average delivered cost of power (energy + capacity) to $42/MWh. However, 
marginal losses are twice average losses so the average marginal loss will be 20%. Losses 
are proportional to the square of the power taken, so losses will be four times as high if 
power taken doubles. If peak power is twice the minimum, then marginal peak losses will 
be 32% and the minimum only 8%.34 Spatial losses (at lower voltages, farther from 
transformers) amplify these further.  
4.3  Illustration of setting retail tariffs 35 
To give some sense of the implications of these principles, suppose low voltage 
customers take one-third the power and twice the average loss and the remainder face 
half the average loss, then the average LV loss will be 20%, the marginal loss will be 
64% at the peak and 16% off-peak, considerably raising the delivered energy price in 
higher demand hours (in this case to 164% of $89.90 = $147.4/MWh), of which half the 
                                                 
33 T&D losses in Peru in 2011 were 6.4% of consumption from 
http://www.tradingeconomics.com/peru/electric-power-transmission-and-distribution-losses-kwh-
wb-data.html but Wikipedia cites 4.7% T losses and 6.3% D losses in 2006, according to 
Ministerio de Energía y Minas 2007, 
34 MIT (2016) cites evidence from Australia (Ausgrid, 2011) indicating peak load marginal loss 
factors of 33-43%, so these rough calculations appear plausible 
35 The actual setting of retail tariffs in Lima appears quite cost reflective, and this section shows 
how to gain a rough sense of the relative sizes of fixed charges, peak and off-peak tariffs for a 
hypothetical set of assumptions, which are not too far from the average retail prices. 
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marginal loss (32% of $89.90 = $28.8/MWh) is a contribution to fixed costs, the balance 
of which still needs to be recovered.  
In a mature system such as the US, T&D costs are one third total electricity 
costs,36 but given the low average wholesale price in Andia, and an expanding system, 
T&D costs are more likely to be as high as generation costs (in this case $40/MWh 
averaged over the whole year),37 and of these, transmission is likely to be roughly one 
quarter ($10/MWh = $45/kWyr at a 52% capacity factor), the rest ($135/kWyr) 
distribution costs.38 Again if LV customers take one third the demand39 but at twice the 
distribution cost ($270/kWyr) while others take the remainder at half the cost ($68/kWyr) 
the total to be recovered (T&D) for LV customers is $315/kWyr. Of this, the contribution 
of the difference in the marginal and average loss factor is $28.8/MWh = $130/kWyr, 
reducing the amount to recover in LV charges for T&D is $186/kWyr. 
If these costs are collected half as fixed charges, half spread over the top quarter 
of hours, the LV fixed charge would be $93/kWyr and as the average demand is 0.14kW 
even if the average peak consumption is twice the average it would only be 0.28kW or a 
charge of $52/yr. The peak hour price would be $147/MWh + ($93/kWyr/1,125hrs = 
$83/MWh) = $230/MWh or 23¢/kWh. The price outside these top demand hours would 
be 8% higher than the wholesale price ($22/MWh) or 2.4¢/kWh. If LV customers have 
the same demand patterns as the total, the average energy price would be 7.6¢/kWh, and 
for a household taking 1,250kWh/yr the energy cost would be $95/yr and the fixed 
charge $93/yr, giving an average electricity bill of 18.8US¢/kWh. It would be quite 
justified to lower the fixed or even the energy element of the T&D charges on some 
classes of customer, recovering the balance from other richer customers or those more 
willing to pay for the public good element of a high penetration network, or by offering 
higher unit prices up to some threshold at which the fixed element is covered.  
                                                 
36 https://www.eia.gov/Energyexplained/index.cfm?page=electricity_factors_affecting_prices  
37 T&D costs in Peru for retail customers in Lima are $52/MWh, and generation (energy and 
capacity and ancillary services) allocated to Lima retail are $81/MWh. Subsidies of $12.3/MWh 
charged to consumers bring the retail price up to $145/MWh or US¢14.5/kWh (correspondence 
with Miguel Juan Revolo Acevedo). T&D costs for retail customers will be higher than the 
average for all customers, although Lima may have a lower T&D cost per customer. 
38 For Lima, excluding RES support charges, generation and ancillary services accounts for about 
60% of the total retail bill, but in other parts of the country T&D costs are likely to be a larger 
proportion of the total. 
39 The domestic share in Peru is closer to one quarter, with 91% penetration and 6.3 million 
households connected. 
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4.4 Assessment of final tariffs 
The most striking conclusions to draw from this back-of-the envelope exercise is 
that fixed charges could make up half the final LV retail customer bill, and that the peak 
price could be nearly ten times the off-peak price. That might lead to a larger percentage 
fall in demand then than in the off-peak hours, suggesting some reallocation between 
peak and off-peak, or three categories, such as super-peak (high energy prices and high 
marginal losses), normal hours, and off-peak (e.g. 10pm-6am) but these are the fine 
details that careful network modeling can reveal, e.g. as exemplified in MIT (2016).  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Efficient pricing requires setting prices at short-run marginal cost, which, in long-
run equilibrium, will on average be equal to long-run marginal costs. As intermittent 
renewable generation increases its share, the ESI is increasingly characterized by high 
fixed costs and low, often very low variable costs but subject to capacity constraints that 
require values from the demand side to determine efficient market-clearing prices. These 
efficient prices can vary dramatically over time and space, and are typically below 
average costs, creating a potential revenue short-fall. Smart metering, dramatic reductions 
in the cost of ICT and the reform of outdated regulatory models should increasingly allow 
these more granular efficient prices to be passed through to distributed energy resources, 
which may be aggregated into virtual power plants to supply flexibility services to TSOs 
and, in future, emerging DSOs. 
The viability of generation, network and retailing companies will increasingly 
depend on how and whether they are allowed to efficiently recover the difference 
between average costs and efficient prices. Setting this levy has much in common with 
setting indirect taxes to raise revenue in a fair and least distortionary way, and as such the 
theory of public finance offers clear guidance on the principles to follow, which have 
been set out in section 2. Their translation into the practical task of setting prices and 
regulated tariffs stresses the importance of passing through such levies to final consumers 
and avoiding net metering, which, with most intermittent generation and all embedded 
generation connected to distribution networks, is increasingly leading to highly distorting 
outcomes in the type, size and location of new generation.  
The case for supporting renewables, set out in section 3, requires a careful 
assessment of the reasons for support (and how much for each immature technology). 
That in turn should influence the forms of support and their proper integration into the 
market. Auctions can deliver superior solutions that bureaucratically set tariffs for RES, 
but the efficient pricing of networks and ancillary services are increasingly important for 
reducing the cost of higher volumes of RES.  
25 
 
Capacity and renewables auctions for suitably designed long-term contracts are an 
attractive way of addressing informational asymmetry and capture of regulators, but 
impose additional threats, in that an auction can settle contracts in an afternoon, and 
unlike regulatory settlements of network tariffs that can be reset after five or so years, the 
contract design can persist for decades. If the network price signals are inefficient, the 
consequences can lock in costly inefficient outcomes for lengthy periods, so it is 
increasingly important for regulators to become familiar with these price-setting theories 
and to ensure that they collect the relevant data to implement them. 
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Appendix: Social Cost-benefit Analysis of PV Subsidies1
1 Learning-by-doing
The one-factor learning model has the unit cost at date , , given by
 =   so ∆ = (1 +∆)
 − 1 (1)
where is cumulative production of the units to date , and measures the rate of cost reduction.
The learning rate, , is the reduction in unit cost for a doubling of capacity, so setting ∆ = 
in (1),  = −∆ = 1 − 2 For  = 22%, (ITRPV, 2016)  = −0358. The factor  can then
be used to estimate the future unit cost from (1). Over longer periods of time, it is implausible
to assume that learning rates can continue until costs fall almost to zero. Equation (1) can be
modified to allow for an irreducible minimum production cost, :
 =  +  =  + (0 − )(0 )
 (2)
Initially, ∆(− ) ' ∆, and the estimated learning rate will not be much aﬀected by this
change, but at lower costs the diﬀerence can become appreciable.
1.1 Predicting unit costs
ITRPV (2016) provides the reference data used here and discussed at more length in Newbery
(2017). If we take the average module price (rather than the US figure) and halve the US
labour cost but estimate for a tracking system, then the 2015 value would be US$ 1,050/kW.
Estimates of the levelized cost of energy (LCoE) depend critically on location (insolation) and
local installation costs. ITRPV (2016, fig 45) forecasts costs for 2,000 kWh/kWyr,2 as US$
44/MWh, and this can achieved in sunny areas of the US. European capacity factors (CFs) are
lower and 1,000 hrs/yr or 11.4% CF. Estimating capacity factors is not straightforward as it
depends not only on location but also the size of the array.3
1This is an abbreviated version of Newbery (2017).
2 i.e. 23% CF, but this appears to be for tracking panels. Bolinger et al., (2016) reports that over half the
US utility-scale PV installations are tracking. The median CF for all types together in 2014 was 25.7%, and the
average was 25.5% with a range from 16% to 30%. Tracking appears to increase CF’s by 5.9% in high insolation
areas, but clearly increases cost. The main determinant of CF is the global horizontal irradiance.
3See http://euanmearns.com/solar-pv-capacity-factors-in-the-us-the-eia-data/ that discusses the very high EIA
CFs, which in California exceed 28%. Smaller roof-top arrays may have CFs of 3% less. For our purposes grid-scale
PV CFs are more relevant.
1
2 Modeling the benefits of PV investment
Let  be PV output at date ,  the current gross investment in PV capacity, whose unit cost is
 and total cost is ,  be current PV capacity, which degrades at rate , (Jordan et al. 2013),
and  be its lifetime. PV generation is  where  is the equivalent full hours output per year.
PV output grows at rate  until date  . Total accumulated production of PV capacity is ,
and this determines the level of accumulated learning to date  according to (1). The amount of
age  capacity remaining at  is −−, so if (  ) = R 0 − = (1− − ),
 = 0  =
Z 
−∞
 = 0 = 
 = 
Z 0
−
(+) = ( +  )  = ( +  )  1
 = 0(0) = 0  = 
 =  = 00(1+) (3)
The value of the external learning benefits is the present discounted value (PDV) of future
cost reductions, discounting at the social discount rate, . Future investment costs are , given
by (3). A change in current investment,  will increase all future values of    , by ,
so the net present discounted cost of this change at  = 0, 0, assuming steady growth until 
will be:
0 =
Z 
0
( + (0 − )(0 )
)−
0
0 = 0 +
Z 
0
(0 − )(0 )
−1 0
0 
−(−)
1
0
0
0 = 1 +
(1− 0)(1− −(−) )
 −  
where 00 has been replaced by . As   0, the second term is negative, indicating future
cost reductions. As a fraction of the current investment cost, this spill-over benefit at date zero
is
(1− 0 )
(1− −(−) )
1 + (−)  (4)
To give a sense of magnitude, with a learning rate  = 22%,  = −0358,  = 15%,
− = 537%, 0 = 25%,  = 3%,  = 25, the learning benefit would be 42% of the cost (and
increasing in both the learning rate,  and ). At earlier periods the first term would increase
towards unity, and for large ( − ) the learning benefit would tend to (1 + (−))−1, or
64% with these figures.
In order to justify this as a subsidy, it must also be the case that the whole trajectory is
socially profitable — it is not enough just to be able to reduce future costs if the technology never
2
achieves adequate future success in the market place. That will depend on the value of the fossil
fuel displaced, including the carbon benefit. Whether or not PV can displace fossil capacity
depends on the coincidence of its output with peak demand. The derating factor of PV,  , is the
amount of derated fossil capacity needed to meet the reliability standard that can be avoided,
in total  (0 ≤   1). In winter-peaking systems PV output is zero in peak hours so  = 0,
and the only benefit is the energy and carbon cost avoided. In summer peaking systems (with
high air-conditioning load),   0, perhaps as high as 30% with low PV penetration.
If the carbon price paid per MWh4 of fossil generation at date  is Γ, which developers
expect to rise at rate , so Γ = Γ0, and the PV output-weighted annual average extra variable
fossil cost (fuel + the excess of the fossil variable O&M over the PV variable O&M less any extra
balancing costs required to manage the PV) is , both per MWh, then the profit of the PV
output is ( + Γ) per year per MW of PV. Ignoring the spill-over of learning benefits, and
granting PV a capacity credit of  per unit of capacity per year, where  is the payment per
unit per year for de-rated capacity,5 the net present discounted cost of a unit investment at date
zero when discounting at a commercial discount rate  is:6
0 = 0 −0 0 =
Z 
0
−[( + Γ0) + ]− (5)
If  and  are constant
0 = (+  )( +) + Γ0( +−  )
If this is positive the investment will need to be subsidized to persuade developers to install
the capacity, but if it becomes negative, the developer needs no inducement (other than perhaps
a long-term contract to assure the future energy and carbon value; under most capacity market
designs the capacity payment would take the form of a long-term contract). This can be evaluated
and the results for various parameter values are shown in Fig. 1 below. The examples provided
tell us that solar PV is already commercially viable without subsidy in high insolation areas
( = 2 000 hrs/yr), but only with an adequate carbon price and reasonably low cost of capital
(Fig. 1, col B vs. Col A). In Northern Europe subsidies (or higher energy prices) would still be
necessary even with cheap finance and a reasonably high carbon price (Fig. 1, col C).
4Subscript  refers to the carbon content of the electricity generated. The carbon price is the one the developers
face, not necessarily the social cost of carbon, .
5This is most readily determined in a capacity auction, or is estimated as the net Cost of New Entry, net of
sales in competitive energy and ancillary service markets.
6The assumption is that the dcveloper takes on marketing risk but will be provided with the equivalent of a
capital subsidy, e.g. via a fixed price per MWh sold up to 20,000MWh/MW. The discount rate is then the
weighted average cost of capital (WACC in fig. 1) given the various contracts for output and capacity designed to
minimise the cost of the support.
3
2.1 Evaluating global learning benefits
One can imagine two possible ways of organizing the Global Apollo Programme (King et al. 2015)
to deliver the PV deployment programme. The least cost solution would be to concentrate all
deployment in locations requiring the least subsidy cost at each moment, in which case  would be
initially high, but as good sites are preferentially used first,  can be expected to decline over time
as less favoured locations are developed when the high insolation areas become saturated, driving
down the local wholesale price. The annual average net value of displaced energy, , could also
fall as areas of high PV depresses local nodal prices, possibly to the extent of driving prices down
to zero in some hours, while the cost of balancing, flexibility services, storage and interconnection
increases, again lowering the average fossil displacement value,  (Newbery, 2016). Similarly, the
value of PV capacity, , might fall as additional PV competes less successfully with existing
PV, although it may be necessary to pay more for flexible conventional generation to compensate
for lower . All these elements can be given decreasing time trends:
 = 0−  = 0−  = 00− (6)
so that (5) can be explicitly written and evaluated on constant growth paths:
 =  −
Z +

−[0−0− + 0−Γ0) + 00−]−
 =  − 0[0−(+)( ++  + )
+Γ0−(−)( ++  −  )]− 00−( ++  )]
Fig. 1 lists the parameters that are allowed to vary in the calculations reported below. Col A
is the base case and individual diﬀerences in parameters are highlighted. (In all calculations,
 =  = 25 years,  = 3%,  = 05%,  = 15%,  = $75/kWyr,  = $10/MWh,  = 0 to
reduce the number of variations).
The social benefit of providing this stream of subsidies assumes that the future PV gross
profits once the PV costs become competitive with fossil fuel are counted as social benefits. In
addition, some of the price decline that aﬀects the commercial viability of PV would not have
occurred in the absence of the subsidy programme and so are additional spillover benefits reaped
by consumers. The simplest assumption is that without PV, fossil prices would not decline, so
all of the price decline is a consumer benefit. The other adjustment to make is that the carbon
price that developers face may understate the global social cost of carbon, and the rate at which
developers assume the carbon price will be allowed to rise may again diﬀer from that of the social
cost. As before, we use capitals to denote the carbon market price, Γ and an expected rate of
growth , and lower case for the social values,  and .
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Figure 1: Profitability of solar PV for various parameters
The total net social benefit of this trajectory, discounting at a social discount rate of , is
then the social gains accruing to other parts, 0, less the cost of the required subsidies, 0:
0 = −0 + 0, where 0 =
Z 
0
−, and (7)
0 =
Z 
0
[(0 − 0−) + 0 − Γ0]−
The PDV of the required unit subsidy, 00, is:
00 = 0[(0)( −   ) + (1− 0)( − (1 + )  )] (8)
−0[0( ++  + )( +  +  −   )
+Γ0( ++  −  )( +  −  −   )]− 00( ++  )( +  −   )
The remaining corrective social benefits can also be evaluated replacing 00 by ( +  ):
00 = 0( +  )[0{( +  −   )− ( +  +  −   )} (9)
+0( +  −  −   )− Γ0( +  −  −   )]
The two components of 00 (equations (8) and (9)) and their sum are shown for various
parameter values in Fig. 1. (The highlighted values indicate changes from the base case shown
in Col A. If   0, all benefits will be somewhat decreased.) The base case shows that while
privately unprofitable without subsidy, 0 is negative, so providing the future fossil savings can
be clawed back or counted as social gains, the trajectory has positive social value even ignoring
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the spill-overs, 0. Allowing for declining  and , ( =  = 1%), Col E shows unsubsidized
PV unprofitable (at  = 7%) but socially profitable. Lower insolation ( = 1 200 hrs) requires
a lower market weighted average cost of capital, WACC, ( = 5%) to be socially profitable (Col
D). Lowering the learning rate , (Col H vs Col E) lowers social profitability, as does raising the
minimum PV cost (Col I) in this case making the trajectory unviable, but see section 2.3 below.
Rasing the rate of growth, , can oﬀset quite a large fall in , (col J).
2.2 A decentralized Apollo Programme
If the funds for supporting PV cannot be directed to developers with the least required subsidy
across the globe, then at best regional support programmes could achieve this regionally with
some loss of average insolation, lowering the average value of , but perhaps, through using
a wider set of countries, decreasing the rates of cannibalization. We can test this by setting
 = 1 200 hrs,  =  =  = 0 in (6), and an average value of  = 5%, as shown in Fig. 1
Col F. Viability with lower insolation and/or higher rates of cannibalization would require lower
discount rates, higher market and/or social carbon prices and/or higher wholesale prices.
2.3 Accelerating investment - deviations from steady growth
The next test is whether it would be desirable to accelerate investment now or delay it. Consider
the net benefit of a small increase in initial PV investment, 0, leaving future investment at
0 unchanged. 0 will be increased by 0, and so will ,   , but by diminishing amounts
as a result of degradation. ,   , will be unchanged. Future cumulative investment  will,
however, be permanently raised by 0 and so 0 = 1. The net benefit of this small increase
can be found by diﬀerentiating (7), noting that 0 aﬀects all future costs, but  is only aﬀected
for  periods, and 0 = −, so:
0
0 = −
0
0 +
0
0  (10)
where
0
0 = 0 +
Z 
0
 0 
− = 0 + 0(1− 0)( −   )
0
0 =
Z 
0
[0− 0 {(0
− − 0) + 0 − Γ0}]−
= 0[0{( +  +  )− ( +  +  + )}+ 0( +  +  −  )− Γ0( +  +  −  )]
The eﬀects of raising the current rate of investment are shown in the last line of fig. 1. Note that
while Col I shows the trajectory to be socially unprofitable, raising the rate of current investment
would improve social value, so there may be another initially higher trajectory with a positive
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social value. The implication is that accelerating the rate of investment in PV is globally socially
justified in all these cases. More important, a global programme to fund continued investment
in solar PV seems socially justified, particularly if it can be located in good resource locations,
and evaluated using a sensible carbon price and public sector (low) discount rate.
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